

A level History Coursework marking training – Module 4

Script A

Historians have disagreed about why the 1789-92 French Constitutional Monarchy was likely to fail from the outset.

What is your view on why the Constitutional Monarchy was likely to fail from the outset?

With reference to three chosen works:

- a. Analyse the ways in which interpretations of the question, problem or issue differ**
- b. Explain the differences you have identified**
- c. Evaluate the arguments, indicating which you found most persuasive and explaining your judgements.**

When the Constitutional Monarchy collapsed on the 10th of August 1792, it incidentally also marked the end of the 400-year-old ancien régime by suspending the final obstacle to its complete destruction. Despite beliefs that it had been toppled three years earlier in 1789, throughout the years of the attempted Constitutional Monarchy, the people never got rid of the feeling that the ancien régime still resided within the continued rulership of Louis XVI. This in essence was as a result of the contradiction within the revolution, a theory predominantly proposed by François Furet, which I will argue ultimately made the downfall of the Constitutional Monarchy inevitable. Alfred Cobban is also part of the group of historians that argue that the Constitutional Monarchy was doomed to fail from the start, but rather for problems incurred as a result of the rapid collapse of the ancien régime. Barry Shapiro similarly believes that the Constitutional Monarchy was doomed from the start, but puts particular emphasis on the infliction of trauma by Louis XVI on the deputies from the events of summer 1789 (i.e. the outset) that ultimately made inevitable the breakdown in the paternal relationship (between Louis XVI and his subjects) and consequently the downfall of the monarchy. In this essay, I aim to explore these nuances, compare them, and explain them, such that I will be able to make my own informed judgement on why the Constitutional Monarchy was likely to fail from the outset. In order to answer this question, it should be noted that I have interpreted the beginning of the Constitutional Monarchy to be the storming of the Bastille in July 1789 as opposed to the de jure creation of the limited monarchy through the Constitution of 1791. This is because the storming of the Bastille marked the point at which the King lost his monopoly on violence, and thereby his symbolic, near-absolute, though evidently not guaranteed, control on the nation.

T2
Context ✓

T2
judgement

3 work!

T1
selection
appropriate

T5
concept
understanding
Argument

1
T2
with 4
Context ✓

While all three historians agree that the final collapse of the Constitutional Monarchy on the 10th August 1792 resulted from more immediate factors, such as the rise of extremist factions, they disagree when on which factor made those successive medium-term events inevitable. For example, on the rise of extremist factions, Cobban advances the idea that the shock dismantlement of the ancien régime gave way to groups seeking to fill the power vacuum: 'in a state in which the old authorities had collapsed and the new ones had hardly begun to function it was inevitable that such revolutionary groups should become the real centres of power.' (Cobban, 1963, p. 177) These groups disputed amongst each other until the radicals emerged victorious and began to pursue their agenda, which eventually culminated in the downfall of the monarchy. Cobban particularly emphasises the role of the Jacobins, with the idea that they 'gradually came to usurp the powers of local government' (Cobban, 1963, p. 178), and through methods such as 'the exploitation of popular discontent and the stirring up of mob passions, whether against aristocrats or priests, or simply political opponents' (Cobban, 1963, p. 178) the 'more advanced revolutionaries were gradually able to impose their rule on France.' (Cobban, 1963, p. 178) It is important to note that Cobban puts emphasis on the idea that the rise of extremism came as a result of the lack of political experience of the deputies – 'What its members lacked was what in the nature of things they could not have acquired – political experience' (Cobban, 1963, p. 180) which caused much of the discontent that led to the rise of the Jacobins, and the sections of society that backed them: 'the Constituent Assembly was unable to control the rising tide of anarchy.' (Cobban, 1963, p. 180) The most prominent example of failure as a result of political inexperience is with the acceptance of Robespierre's self-denying ordinance by the moderates in September 1791, which empowered the radicals by phasing out the moderates, and such doomed the monarchy by allowing the radicals to thereafter freely pursue their agenda: 'but he could not have secured its acceptance without the support of the right, whose hatred for the constitutionalists led them to deal this last blow to their enemies even if it was to prove fatal to themselves and to the king.' (Cobban, 1963, p. 184) Cobban therefore argues that this pre-existing factor of inexperience, that came from the shock transition from the ancien régime, made the downfall of the Constitutional Monarchy inevitable in the way that it significantly contributed to the deputies' mistakes that allowed the radicals to become powerful and the moderates to be phased out.

T3
analysis
view
of
Cobban

While agreeing with Cobban's argument that the rise of extremism was a primary factor in the downfall of the Constitutional Monarchy, Furet's argument differs in the way in which he

T3
differs

proposes the Jacobins gained power. While Cobban acknowledges that the Jacobins exploited 'political discontent' (Cobban, 1963, p. 178), Furet expands on this by explaining their rise through his theory of a contradiction within the revolution. He does this by expanding on one of the most prominent examples of the contradiction, being the limitation of the franchise as a result of the distinction between active and non-active citizens that reminded many of the unfair and unequal nature of the ancien régime they had just revolted against: 'nonetheless, it rested on a distinction between civil rights, which were universal, and political rights, which were not: to that democratic man who was the central representation of the Revolution it added a contradictory element, at this sensitive spot.' (Furet, 1995, p. 99) In this way, Furet blames the rise of extremism on the contradiction of the compromise that was the Constitutional Monarchy, which was in turn easily capitalized on by the radical groups – 'It was not by chance that Robespierre built his reputation as defender of the people on criticism of the *censitaire* electoral system.' (Furet, 1995, p. 99) Furet therefore proposes the Constitutional Monarchy was doomed from the outset as a result of its flawed systematic nature, of retaining a 'king in a republican constitution' (Furet, 1995, p. 99) to which he would never belong and would be inevitably ousted (as a symbol of the ancien régime). He highlights that the continuation of ancien régime practices in the distinction between active and passive citizens only strengthened this feeling amongst the people.

T3
Heavy
analysis
of
Furet's
view
and how
different
to Cobban
Agreed

Shapiro takes quite a different approach to this; while he still argues that the rise of extremist groups set up the conditions to which the Constitutional Monarchy fell, he explains their rise through his theory of traumatic politics. Rather than blaming the inexperience of the deputies, or the contradiction between revolutionary ideals and what actually materialised, he blames the actions of the crown in the 18th century in the way in which it has managed to set the conditions to which the people and the monarch seemed to have a paternal relationship. This explains the phenomenon whereby many of the moderate deputies, in denial over Louis XVI making mistakes, forced themselves to divert blame for every wrongdoing by Louis XVI: 'For the traumatized deputies of 1789, depending upon whether denial or repetition was ascendant, Louis was either a saintly good father deceived by his evil advisers or a traitorous enemy who ... they believed was willing to have them killed to protect his own interests.' (Shapiro, 2015, p. 116) He argues that this paternal-traumatic relationship, combined with Louis XVI's mistakes such as his supposed 'public declaration of political war against the revolutionaries' (Shapiro, 2015, p. 115) when he utilized physical force on 20 June 1789, produced a traumatic

T3
left

response from the deputies which essentially radicalized many of the moderates beyond the extent to which they could 'convince themselves that their emotional connection to the king which his evil advisers had put at risk had now been restored.' (Shapiro, 2015, p. 114) Thus, Shapiro argues that 'the traumatization of summer 1789 ultimately severely undermined and perhaps largely foreclosed the possibility of establishing a constitutional monarchy in which the representatives and the monarch could have worked out ways of relating to each other as opponents rather than enemies.' (Shapiro, 2015, p. 117) In contrast to the other two historians, Shapiro therefore argues that it was not pre-existing systematic or logistical issues that doomed the Constitutional Monarchy from the outset, rather a combination of Louis XVI's actions and the existing paternal turned traumatic relationship that made it such that radicalism emerged from a sense of 'betrayal' amongst the deputies following the events of summer 1789.

T3
clear +
precise
exposition
of
different
positions of
Shapiro from two
Agreed

Shapiro makes an notable point when discussing the 'desacralization' argument made by many historians; while not refuting the existence of 'desacralization' over the 18th century, he refutes its impact upon the viability of the Constitutional Monarchy by arguing against historians such as Merrick, Van Kley and especially Chartier and his 'affective rupture' theory by instead supporting 'Tackett's assertion' (Shapiro, 2015, p. 107) that countered the notion of a 'prerevolutionary dethronement' (Shapiro, 2009, p. 3) of the king by conversely stating that 'during the early days of the Estates-General, the vast majority of Third Estate representatives were firmly convinced that Louis XVI was "on their side" and that "all reforms must be accomplished under the close auspices of the monarchy"' (Shapiro, 2015, p. 107). Interestingly, at this point of the argument Shapiro directly addresses Furet's argument that 'a viable constitutional monarchy "could never have been implemented"' (Shapiro, 2015, p. 109) and instead proposes the idea that, in response to 'desacralization', the royal propagandists had only promoted 'strong ties with a more down-to-earth and "democratic" monarch' (Shapiro, 2015, p. 107) which set the conditions to which 'the emotional and ideological foundations for a workable constitutional monarchy can be said to have been present' (Shapiro, 2015, p. 107). In this way, the historians thereby also disagree upon when exactly it was doomed to fail – Furet and Cobban propose that it was always doomed to fail due to the inherent issues with the concept of a Constitutional Monarchy and the repercussions of a shock transition between government forms, while Shapiro argues that the downfall only became inevitable during summer 1789 as a result of Louis XVI's trauma inducing actions, the effect of which was made worse by the existing paternal relationship.

T1
further
aspect
of
disagreement
essential
though
analysis
(T3 too)

The reason why these historians have reached different conclusions can be attributed to their own approach to the French Revolution, and the nature of their own political views and interests. One aspect of similarity in this regard is with Cobban and Furet, who both agree that the Constitutional Monarchy was doomed from the outset due to systemic and logistical issues within the revolution and have deduced this argument within books that examine the French Revolution on a long term and wide scale. Furet's 'Revolutionary France, 1770-1880' and Cobban's 'A History of Modern France, Volume One' each respectively look at a hundred years of the French Revolutionary period, and Cobban over his three volumes, 250 years. The significance of this is that it may impact their judgements over the interpretation of what exactly caused the downfall of the Constitutional Monarchy, as they may be trying to work it into a longer-term framework of interpretation. For example, Furet's recognition of a contradiction within the revolution on which he bases his argument is examined with the hindsight of the later victories of the republicans over the monarchists in the 1870s in achieving a lasting settlement that Furet proposes reconciled the apparent issue of past contradictions: 'only the victory of republicans over monarchists in 1876-7 provided modern France with a regime that established in lasting form the full range of the principles of 1789 ensuring not only civic equality but also political liberty.' (Furet, 1995, p. ix) Perhaps the fact that there was no further revolution following the settlement of the 1870s guided Furet's approach to the 1789-92 Constitutional Monarchy in which he details the problems of that revolution to be what was reconciled in the 1870s. Another problem this entails is that these historians, focussing on such wide periods, may gloss over detail in order to produce a theory on the interconnectedness of events throughout the 200 years of French Revolutionary study. The method Furet used to derive his theory of a contradiction within the revolution comes to mind most when thinking about this, as pointed out by many when assessing his work: 'his conceptual approach to history, in which he preferred to overlook minute detail in favor of political and philosophical analysis.' (Riding, 1997) Similarly, Cobban's need to summarise vast swathes of history means that he is inevitably 'led to postulate hypotheses which he has not the space to defend in detail, and to advance interpretations which all would not accept.' (Hampson, 1963) On the other hand, Shapiro's article in McPhee covers only 1789-93 and similarly his other published work such as Traumatic Politics or Revolutionary Justice in Paris only deals with the King during the period of constitutional monarchy or the period 1789-90, and so it can be said that he looks at history on much more of a limited scale. His lack of interest therefore to come up with an overarching argument to do with French democracy on a 100-to-200-year scale inevitably means that his conclusions will be more as a result of detailed events rather than wide

T3
focus
on
basis
of
diff. views

π syp
π syp
used
for T3
understand
of
this is

Agreed. This
exploration is
thorough + brings
out differences clearly
Lots of evidence
of T3 individuality
of basis @ 25

movements and trends. This is important when considering the debate over what made the downfall of the Constitutional Monarchy inevitable, as Furet has identified a contradiction in the revolution within the examined hindsight of what exactly happened after, as compared to Shapiro who only covers the 'Early French Revolution' and thus does not need to create an overall 'theme' to explain why the next revolution happened and later failed in France in 1830, in the same way Cobban and Furet need to.

T3 bus's
summary
✓

On the topic of a framework that historians may apply, it is also important to consider the fact that both Cobban and Furet had similar political beliefs, and therefore interpreted the Revolution in a classical liberal fashion. It also should be noted that Furet was once part of the 'Annales school', which was a group of historians that predominantly focused on social and economic history as opposed to political history. Furet grew to reject this proposal, and notably rejected his own Marxist views and instead grew to advocate the classical liberal view that Cobban had championed. He came to emulate Cobban's focus on political history as opposed to social and economic history, which came from Cobban's own belief that passing judgement on economic history is flawed because 'the results of research in this field are still hardly adequate even for a broad picture.' (Cobban, 1963, p. 1) This impacts their judgements because they therefore solely focus on political history, in the form of their direct focus on the Constituent and Legislative assemblies. They will therefore not have the same perspective on the significance of the crowd as would economic historians since they did not consider them when thinking about the reasons for the downfall of the Constitutional Monarchy. For example, the conclusions cited above on what exactly motivated the nation to turn to radicalism is impacted by such negation; others such as the Marxist historian George Rudé would cite poor economic conditions that precipitated the growth of the sans-culottes as a political force and thus was the reason for the driving of 'the Revolution leftwards along courses neither intended nor desired by the men of 1789.' (Rudé, 1989, p. 73) Cobban and Furet only superficially cover this in their works, focussing much more on the political nature of the dynamic between the assemblies and the monarchy, and such may skew their own conclusions when deciding why the Constitutional Monarchy was likely to fail from the outset. Furet also specifically formed his arguments with the aim to contradict Marxist interpretations, by showing how important political history was compared to social history: 'Furet refuted Marxist theory and resurrected the idea that the French Revolution might have been driven by political aims as much as by social conditions or class dissatisfaction.' (Llewellyn & Thompson, 2012)

T3
understanding
of the
active
historical
debate
Top. Clear
gap in influence of
ideology +
School of thought

T3
bus's

T1
supp

T1
supp.

more T3 bus's
Q L5

Shapiro similarly focuses on political history, though this is as a result of his own goal of tying the disciplines of psychology and history together rather than a lack of interest on the economic and social history: 'In proposing to view the Constituent Assembly's decision making through a lens fashioned by psychological theory and clinical practice, this study aims to provide a new perspective on a classical problem in French revolutionary historiography' (Shapiro, 2009, p. 1). This is therefore indicative of the possibility that Shapiro may have attempted to apply a specific lens when analysing the outcomes of the period such to fit his psychoanalytical framework about trauma. It should also be noted that, though Shapiro himself lacked a clear historical movement or school to latch his work onto, he viewed his work to be a response to the revisionist view on the Revolution: 'my book is primarily positioned in opposition to the so-called "revisionist" historians (e.g., Francois Furet and Keith Baker) who emphasize the extent to which the radicalism and violence of the later stages of the Revolution were already present in embryonic form at the beginning and that efforts to establish Constitutional Monarchy had therefore little or no chance of succeeding.' (Shapiro, 2018) Considering the fact that Shapiro thus went into his work with the intention of analysing different evidence such to gain a different outlook on the actions of the deputies from 1789-93, his conclusions are impacted by the evidence he selects – perhaps the fact that Shapiro predominantly relied upon the letters of deputies to their constituents to build his theory of trauma means that he gained a much more narrow view on why the Constitutional Monarchy was likely to fail from the outset as compared to Cobban and Furet.

T3
basis
of
diff.

T4 eval / sub-2 (c)

In consideration of all the arguments, I side with Cobban and Furet's, that the Constitutional Monarchy was likely to fail from the outset because of pre-existing systemic issues; that it was always doomed to fail, against Shapiro's theory of trauma causing the inevitable failure of the revolution only following Louis XVI's brash actions during the outset of the Constitutional Monarchy in summer 1789. To therefore support Cobban and Furet's argument against Shapiro's, that Louis XVI's actions were inevitable and such the Constitutional Monarchy was always likely to fail from the outset, one specific event comes to mind that had significant ramifications on the continued existence of the Constitutional Monarchy: the rejection of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790. Even if Louis XVI had not acted brashly during the summer of 1789, the ramifications of this event demonstrates how the Constitutional Monarchy was always inevitably doomed as a result of the necessity of the revolution to remove all aspects of the ancien régime – to which Louis would have inevitably resisted. Furthermore, a similar

T2
context

T4
valid
argument

act of 'betrayal' that Shapiro proposes doomed the revolution from summer 1789 onwards (namely the use of troops on the 20th June 1789) would have occurred anyway with Louis' rejection of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. The document was significant in driving the large divide between the people and the monarchy, marking a point at which both parties realised they could never harmoniously co-operate, and caused the Flight to Varennes, the point of no return. As Aston, a respected historian focussing on Louis XVI's role in bringing the downfall of the monarchy, recognises in his work, 'McManners argued that "If there was a point at which the Revolution "went wrong", it was with the imposition of the oath"' (Aston, 2004, p. 26). In Doyle's earlier article attacking the desacralization argument, similarly refuted by Shapiro, he argues that the Civil Constitution of the Clergy rather than desacralization caused the downfall of the regime. He argued that Louis XVI went along with the transfer of power until the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was proposed, which was perceived by Louis to be the Revolution's 'attack on religion which led to the flight to Varennes – and that in turn which triggered a logic which brought war and the downfall of a monarch seen to be on league with the enemy.' (Doyle, 2000, p. 24) In consideration of these alternative views, I would therefore argue that it was inevitable that Louis XVI would reject the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, due to factors and conditions that were formed before the summer of 1789 such as the deeply religious and divine characteristic of the monarchy that Louis XVI could have never parted with. Similarly, the National Assembly would have inevitably passed this law as it stood in the way of completing the destruction of the ancien régime – as Lewis puts it, a historian who rejected both revisionist and Marxist interpretations of the Revolution, the Church was 'deemed to be yet another bastion of aristocratic privilege' (Lewis, 1999, p. 30). Thus, in the assembly's apparent crusade to overturn all elements of feudalism, they had inadvertently revealed that the King was the last barrier to its complete destruction. In this way, the effect and existence of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy supports Cobban and Furet's argument of pre-existing problems in the revolution making downfall inevitable. This is because it is an example of the disruption that would inevitably occur in the compromising system of constitutional monarchy, with an Assembly desperate to dismantle the ancien régime to justify the revolution, and the incompatible force Louis XVI acted in the pursuit of that goal.

Sustained + well-supported evaluation using both historical knowledge + supplementary sources.

TH numerical evaluation

Agreed – subsequent building of a position based on this but significant distinction

However, I agree with Shapiro's arguments against Furet in one area: refuting the idea of a 'prerevolutionary dethronement' (Shapiro, 2009, p. 3) of the king – which is essentially part of the desacralization argument that Shapiro associates with historians such as Furet and Halévi

in reference to their book, *Monarchie républicaine*. This is because, as Shapiro and Doyle argue against other historians such as Van Kley and Robert Chartier, that desacralization is simply not enough to explain the reason behind the inevitability of the Constitutional Monarchy's collapse. Doyle himself counters the desacralization argument by noting that there was not much sacralization in the first place – 'how "sacralized" had the monarchy ever been in the minds of ordinary French people?' (Doyle, 2000, p. 25), going on to also state that there had even been 'grumblings' about royal extravagance, warmongering, and religious persecution at arguably the height of absolute monarchy and 'sacralization' under Louis XIV (The 'sun' king) that historians such as Van Kley would argue would have been indicative towards a collapse of royal authority. Shapiro himself argues that even if desacralization did occur, it was countered by royal propaganda, thereby setting up the preconditions to which the paternal relationship existed between the king and his subjects, to which the ideological foundations for the monarchy would have thus been there. In this way, while agreeing with most of Furet's argument about structural reasons causing the inevitability of the downfall of the Constitutional Monarchy, I disagree with the notion of 'desacralization' affecting the downfall of the monarchy, and such conclude that the notion of a contradiction within the revolution can exist independently of 'desacralization' – that the Constitutional Monarchy was doomed before it started for inherent systemic issues rather than long-term 'desacralization'.

T1
range
of
material

T1
supp

T2
context

T2
T4
judges
fully substituted
+ original

In conclusion, it has become clear that the Constitutional Monarchy was likely to fail from the outset as a result of pre-existing structural and logistical reasons; due to Furet's proposal of a contradiction within the revolution in combination with Cobban's argument about the repercussions from the shock collapse of the ancien régime, rather than for any other reason such as Louis XVI's mistakes in summer 1789 (which Shapiro argues was made worse by the present paternal relationship) or a "prerevolutionary" dethronement of the king' (Shapiro, 2009, p. 3). This is because the form of government that was constitutional monarchy would have never been able to suit revolutionary France's need at the time; it was ineffectual at a time when the nation needed to be divisive to solve the political issues of the day - as Cobban notes Dumont's view about the state of the Constitution, it "was a veritable monster: there was too much republic for a monarchy, and too much monarchy for a republic." (Cobban, 1963, p. 185) In this way, the Constitutional Monarchy was likely to fail from the outset due to the inevitable frustration that would come about upon the realisation by the increasingly sovereign people of France that Louis XVI stood in the way of the complete destruction of the ancien

T2
judges
T4/C
judges

substantive

régime – that the Constitutional Monarchy, in its existence, compromising nature and co-operation with the king, harboured and maintained the ‘contradiction within the revolution’.

Word Count: 3968 = *concise*

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Sustained evaluation against with mature reasoning + based on analysis of a wide range of material

- T1: L5 + *Wide range of material + much is used → supplementary material synthesised effectively. Issues clearly understood.*
- T2: L5 = *All reading is used to reach a judgement with sound contextual knowledge.*
- T3: L5 + *Strong both on the differences of the 1-112 for those views + differences.*
- T4: L5 = *Evidence all based on fully justified reasoning which makes context clear.*
- T5: L5 = *Focus clearly understood + questions fully answered with clarity + precision.*

Secure Level 5 and concise – so full marks available. 10

Agreed.

40

T1: evidence of range of material & reasons for selections

Coursework resource record

Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in History				
Centre name: [REDACTED]				
Candidate name: [REDACTED]				
Resources used. The three works chosen for the assignment must be asterisked.	Page/web reference	Student comments	Student date(s) when accessed	Teacher initials and date resource record checked
*Cobban, A., <i>A History of Modern France, Volume One</i> (Penguin, 1963)	pp. 162-200	Argues that the shock dismantlement of the ancien regime leads to many problems, such as the rise of extremist factions to fill in the power vacuum, who would eventually undo the system through their gradual phasing out of the moderates, such as with the later self-denying ordinance. Also argues that one factor for the fall of the constitutional monarchy that began before it even started, was the lack of experience of the deputies which caused a multitude of problems, such as the political friction between the parties they were not used to dealing with. Also argues that the war was not just as a result of factional struggles, but of a need to rectify a previous half century of humiliating defeats. I will use this work as a core work, as it presents the lack of experience argument for the downfall of the constitutional monarchy.	16/09/2021	28/09/2021 TCHN

Doyle, W., The Execution of Louis XVI and the End of the French Monarchy, <i>History Review</i> (March 2000)	pp. 21-24	<p>Doyle presents several arguments for the reasons behind Louis XVI's execution. He focuses on one in particular, the long-term desacralisation of the monarchy that by the time of the revolution the image of the monarchy was in such a state to be challenged. However, he goes on to argue that this alone is not adequate enough to explain Louis XVI's death, instead that the reasons for the downfall of Constitutional Monarchy was the Flight to Varennes, which was in turn caused by the rejection of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. Thus argues that Constitutional Monarchy was not doomed from the outset.</p> <p>I will use this work as a supplementary work, as it does not explore Doyle's argument in the relatively short number of pages such that I would be comfortable of it using it as a core work, but it is useful nonetheless because of his presentation of the desacralisation argument, even if he does disagree.</p>	22/08/2021	28/09/2021 TCHN
Aston, N., <i>The French Revolution 1789-1804: Authority, Liberty, and the Search for Stability</i> (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)	pp. 9-30	Argues that the French Revolution was as a result of medium-term issues, such as the political problems and financial problems, and more so the 'destabilising efforts made to resolve them.' Does recognise the fact that the stress points in the French polity pre-dated the start of Louis XVI's reign in 1774. Even more so, he strongly argues the idea that it was a lack of initiative by both Louis XVI and his ministers that created the conditions for constitutional monarchy, and its eventual failure. Argues that the final blow was dealt with the imposition of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which forced Louis XVI and much of the nobility to consider emigrating, or fleeing.	25/08/2021	28/09/2021 TCHN

		I will use this work as a supplementary work rather than a main work as it argues too much in favour of Louis XVI being the downfall of the nation.		
Rudé, G., <i>The French Revolution</i> (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1989)	pp. 71-79	Argues that a multitude of factors caused the downfall of constitutional monarchy, but the flight to Varennes was the most significant of all by indirectly contributing to the war that ultimately dealt the final blow. I will not use this work.	28/08/2021	28/09/2021 TCHN
Lewis, G., <i>The French Revolution: Rethinking the Debate</i> (Routledge, 1999)	pp. 24-41	Argues that France was too divided in its beliefs to permit a non-violent transfer of power, or even a compromise in the form of constitutional monarchy. The contradiction of the revolution prevented many from forming groups that could be dealt with through compromises, and thus none could be made. Essentially implies the fact that the King was the last bastion of ancien regime feudalism, and thus with the modernisation of the country it was essential to remove him also. Thus, argues that Constitutional Monarchy was doomed from the outset. I will use this work as a supplementary work as it is especially useful when arguing the inherent contradiction of the revolution.	27/08/2021	28/09/2021 TCHN
*Shapiro, B., The Case Against the King, in McPhee, P (ed.), <i>A Companion to the French Revolution</i> (Blackwells, 2015)	pp. 107-120	Initially refutes the idea that the reason for the Constitutional Monarchy being doomed from the outset was from the people; the deputies initially were on Louis XVI's side, and the royal propagandists had laid the ground for a democratic monarchy in the preceding decades. Rather he argues, through Shapiro's theory about traumatic politics, Constitutional Monarchy fell because of the paternal relationship dynamic between Louis XVI and the deputies, which ultimately left Louis with much responsibility when it came to his actions. This relationship only intensified the	23/08/2021	28/09/2021 TCHN

		<p>divide between Louis XVI and the people when Louis XVI let them down further. Also argues that it had the effect of ousting the moderate propensities of the deputies.</p> <p>I will use this work as a core work as it provides another lens to why the Constitutional Monarchy was doomed from the outset.</p>		
Shapiro, B., <i>Traumatic Politics: The Deputies and the King in the Early French Revolution</i> (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009)	pp. 162-184	<p>Shapiro continues his argument about 'traumatic politics', while also refuting other arguments, such as the "desacralisation" argument through looking at events such as the suspensive veto granted to the King by the deputies.</p> <p>I will use this work as a supplementary work, as it only continues the ideas of the previous Shapiro work, while focussing too much on what happens after the imposition of constitutional monarchy that does not benefit me much more than Shapiro's first work about Traumatic Politics.</p>	23/09/2021	28/09/2021 TCHN
Tackett, T., <i>When the King Took Flight</i> (Harvard University Press, 2003)	pp. 219-223	<p>Argues that the Flight to Varennes was the turning point in the survival of the Constitutional Monarchy, and that it was not doomed from the outset. Argues that it would have worked if Louis XVI had given his full support, all pretences of which were abandoned on the night he fled. Argues that the deputies had managed to work out a situation in which social and political unrest was reduced, and that all that was needed was the King's support, but his choice to flee the country ruined it all.</p> <p>I will use this work as a supplementary work, as it is a useful example of a direct contradiction to the idea that Constitutional Monarchy was doomed from the outset.</p>	12/08/2021	28/09/2021 TCHN
Hardman, J., Louis XVI and the French Revolution, <i>History Review</i> (September 1996)	pp. 37-42	<p>Argues that previous kings such as Louis XIV and Louis XV set in stone the prerequisites for a disloyal nobility, and Louis XVI only sparked it. This in turn set off the chain of events, and eventual loss of control of the revolution from</p>	25/08/2021	28/09/2021 TCHN

		<p>the first estate to the third. Argues that Louis XVI on the whole is not as incompetent and indecisive as many believe him to be, but still argues that he should not be made out 'to be a saint'. Also argues that the lack of trust following the decades of perceived royal despotism and failure on Louis XVI's part to show leadership on the matter of the Estates-General voting agreement produced 'a sense of betrayal and (after Louis brought up troops, though their orders were strictly defensive) fear and a thirst for vengeance.' Since Louis XVI was given a tough situation from the start in which he had no part in the Constitution, 'save for a choice of acceptance or rejection, which would lead to his abdication and possibly death', Hardman argues that this situation forced the subsequent events such as the October Days and Flight to Varennes to occur. Also argues that governance under the Constitution was made to be too gridlocked, and therefore caused Constitutional Monarchy to fail. Finally argues that Constitutional Monarchy would not have failed in the case that Louis XVI's cousin took the throne, as many of the issues with the Constitutional Monarchy such as legitimacy and popularity would have been solved, though counters that with the idea that Louis XVI would have never allowed that to happen.</p> <p>I will not use this work – while it does have the same worth as many of my full works, it argues the Louis XVI point of view of doomed from the outset, which I am not focusing on.</p>		
*Furet, F., <i>Revolutionary France, 1770-1880</i> (Wiley, 1995)	pp. 95-116	<p>Argues along the lines of a contradiction placed within the revolution, of the fact that there was essentially a republican constitution while maintaining a King. Important to note that he makes the important distinction between the civil revolution and the political revolution, as he makes</p>	25/09/2021	28/09/2021 TCHN

		<p>the case that the civil revolution was widely backed by all (1789) while the topics on for debate in the political revolution starkly divided the country to the extent that the compromise of constitutional monarchy would eventually be undermined. Implied through his argument that war was inevitable, as the gridlock conflict resulting from the constitution created a situation in which both sides (the Monarchists and Republicans) wanted war in order to oust the other.</p> <p>I will use this work as a core work as it presents an important argument for a contradiction within the revolution as a reason for the failure of the constitutional Monarchy.</p>		
Rudé, G., <i>The Crowd in the French Revolution</i> (Oxford University Press, 1959)	pp. 61-112	<p>Rudé argues that the crowd as a political force directly causes the downfall of the constitutional monarchy, as a result of a combination of economic and political factors that led to popular discontent with the state of the Constitutional Monarchy and the development of the crowd as a political force.</p> <p>I will use this as a supplementary work as it is a useful alternative argument that proposes that economic failures caused discontent, which I will use to contrast against the solely political arguments of my core works.</p>	16/02/2022	13/03/2022 TCHN